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In this short paper we provide two versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a 
world with only one preference profile.  Both versions are extremely simple and allow a 
transparent understanding of Arrow’s theorem.  The first version assumes a two-agent 
society; the second version, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assumes two or more 
agents.  Both of our theorems rely on diversity of preferences axioms; our first theorem 
also uses a neutrality-independence assumption, commonly used in the literature; our 
second theorem uses a neutrality-independence-monotonicity (NIM) assumption, which 
is  stronger and less commonly used.  Using the NIM assumption results in substantial 
gains in terms of simplicity.  We provide examples to show the logical independence of 
the axioms, and to illustrate our points. 
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1.  Introduction. 
  In 1950 Kenneth Arrow (1950, 1963) provided a striking answer to a basic 
abstract problem of democracy:  how can the preferences of many individuals be 
aggregated into societal preferences?  Arrow’s answer, which has come to be known as 
his impossibility theorem, was that every conceivable aggregation method has some flaw.  
That is, a handful of reasonable-looking axioms, which one hopes an aggregation 
procedure would satisfy, lead to impossibility:  the axioms are mutually inconsistent.  In 
his Introduction to the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,  Suzumura (2002) points 
out that Arrow’s impossibility theorem had a revolutionary impact on the whole of social 
choice theory; in the same volume Campbell and Kelly (2002) indicate that social choice 
theory was in fact spawned by Arrow’s theorem.  The theorem has also had a major 
influence on the larger fields of economics and political science, as well as on distant 
fields like mathematical biology.  (See, e.g.,  Bay and McMorris (2003).) 
  In this paper we shall develop two versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.  
Our models are so-called single-profile models.  This means impossibility is established 
in the context of one fixed profile of preferences, rather than in the (standard) Arrow 
context of many varying preference profiles.  In our first version of impossibility, there 
are only 2 individuals.  In the second version, there are 2 or more individuals.  Single-
profile Arrow theorems were first proved in the late 1970’s by Parks (1976), Hammond 
(1976), Kemp and Ng (1976), Pollak (1979), and Roberts (1980).  Our second version of 
Arrow’s theorem is close to Pollak’s.  Rubinstein (1984) used  mathematical logic to see 
whether or not there are single-profile versions of every multi-profile theorem of social 
choice. 
  1Other related literature includes Geanakoplos (1996), who has three very short 
proofs of Arrow’s theorem in the standard multi-profile context, and Ubeda (2004) who 
has another short multi-profile proof.  Ubeda makes an observation that some of his 
arguments establish “Arrow’s theorem for societies with two individuals with strict 
preferences.”  This observation, for a multi-profile model,  is somewhat similar to our 
first version of Arrow’s theorem.  Reny (2001) has an interesting side-by-side pair of 
(multi-profile) proofs, of Arrow’s theorem and the related theorem of Gibbard and 
Satterthwaite.  
Single-profile Arrow impossibility theorems were devised in response to an 
argument of Samuelson (1967) against Arrow.   Samuelson claimed that Arrow’s model, 
with varying preference profiles, is irrelevant to the problem of maximizing a Bergson-
Samuelson-type social welfare function (Bergson (1938)), which depends on a given set 
of ordinal utility functions, that is, a fixed preference profile.  The single-profile Arrow 
theorems established that bad results (dictatorship, or illogic of social preferences, or, 
more generally, impossibility of aggregation) could be proved with one fixed preference 
profile (or set of ordinal utility functions), provided the profile is “diverse” enough.  Our 
main purpose in this paper is to give two short and easy-to-understand single-profile 
Arrow theorems.  Our theorems do not require the existence of large numbers of 
alternatives, unlike previous single-profile Arrow results.  Our secondary purpose is to 
explore various possible assumptions regarding preference profile “diversity.”   
 
2.  The Models. 
  We assume a society with   individuals, and 3 or more alternatives.   2 ≥ n
  2 A specification of the preferences of all individuals is called a preference profile.  There 
is only one preference profile.  The preference profile is transformed into a social 
preference relation.  Both the individual and the social preference relations allow 
indifference.  The individual and social preference relations are all assumed to be 
complete and transitive.  The following notation is used:  Generic alternatives are x, y, z , 
w, etc.  Particular alternatives are a, b, c , d, etc.  A generic person is labeled i, j, k and so 
on; a particular person is 1, 2, 3  and so on.  Person i’s preference relation is Ri.  xRiy 
means person i prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPiy means i prefers x to y; 
xIiy means i is indifferent between them.  Society’s preference relation is R.  xRy means 
society prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPy means society prefers x to y;  xIy 
means society is indifferent between them.  We will start with the following assumptions: 
 
(1.a)  Pareto principle.  For all x and y, if xPiy for all i, then xPy. 
(1.b)  Strong Pareto principle.  For all x and y, if xRiy for all i, and xPiy for some 
i, then xPy. 
(2.a)  Neutrality/independence (NI).  Suppose individual preferences for w vs. z 
are identical to individual preferences for x vs. y.  Then the social preference for w 
vs. z must be identical to the social preference for x vs. y.  More formally:  For all 
x, y, z, and w, assume that, for all i, xPiy if and only if wPiz, and zPiw if and only if  
yPix.  Then wRz if and only if xRy, and zRw if and only if yRx. 
(3)  No dictator.  There is no dictator.  Individual i is a dictator if, for all x and y, 
xPiy implies xPy. 
  3(4.a)  Diverse-1 preferences.  There exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that 
xPiy for all i, but opinions are split on x vs. z, and on y vs. z.  That is, some people 
prefer x to z and some people prefer z to x, and, similarly,  some people prefer y to 
z and some people prefer z to y.   
 
Note that we have two alternative versions of the Pareto principle here.  The first 
is more common in the Arrow’s theorem literature  (e.g., see Campbell and Kelly (2002), 
p. 42), and when we need to distinguish this version from the second, we will call it the 
“standard” version.  We will use the strong version of the Pareto principle in our n = 2 
impossibility theorem below.  Obviously the strong Pareto principle implies the standard 
Pareto principle.  Neutrality-independence, assumption 2.a, and diverse-1 preferences, 
assumption 4.a, are so numbered because we will introduce alternatives later on. 
 
3.  Some Examples in a 2-Person Model. 
  We will illustrate with a few simple examples.  For these examples there are 2 
people and 3 alternatives, and we assume no individual is indifferent between any pair of 
alternatives, although society might be.  Given that we aren’t allowing individual 
indifference, the two Pareto principles collapse into one.  Preferences of the 2 people are 
shown by listing the alternatives from top (most preferred) to bottom (least preferred).  In 




  4Example 1: 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(Majority Rule)
a c   
b  a  aPb, aIc & bIc 
c b   
 
The social preference relation is based on majority rule.  Therefore, aPb because 
a beats b in a vote, while aIc and bIc, because votes between those pairs result in ties.  
The Pareto principle is obviously satisfied.  NI is satisfied:  individual preferences for a 
vs. c are identical to individual preferences for b vs. c, and the social preference for a vs. 
c is identical to the social preference for b vs. c.  There is no dictator.  The preferences of 
the two people satisfy the diverse-1 preferences assumption, since both people prefer a to 
b, but opinions are split when it comes to a vs. c and b vs. c.  In short, our 4 assumptions 
are satisfied.  We should have an Arrow impossibility result here, and we do, because the 
social preferences are not transitive.  With  aPb and  bIc transitivity implies aPc, but this 
contradicts aIc.  Example 1 is therefore a 2-person voting paradox, slightly different from 
the classical 3-person Condorcet voting paradox, which we will visit later in this paper. 
We now modify example 1 very slightly, by changing individual 1’s preferences.  
Example 2:  
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(Majority Rule)
a c   
c a  aIc 
b b  aPb & cPb 
 
  5  The Pareto principle requires that aPb and cPb, which majority voting delivers. 
NI still holds.  There is no dictator.  Opinions are split on a vs. c, but not on b vs. c; both 
people view b as the worst alternative.  Since we don’t have opinions split over the two 
pairs of alternatives, the diverse-1 preferences assumption no longer holds.  Three of our 
4 assumptions hold.  Now examine the social preference relation.  It is obviously 
complete.  Is it transitive?  The answer is yes; for example aIc and cPb should imply aPb, 
which majority rule delivers.  
  In short, example 2 shows that if we drop the diverse-1 preferences assumption, 
the remaining 3 assumptions can be mutually consistent. 
In example 3 we return to the same individual preferences as example 1, but we 
now assume society is indifferent among all 3 alternatives.  This is of course a complete 
and transitive preference relation for society.  Obviously we are dropping the Pareto 
principle.  
Example 3: 
Person 1 Person 2 Society
a c   
b a  aIbIc 
c b   
 
Does this example violate any of the 4 assumptions, other than Pareto?   NI must hold 
since the social preference for w vs. z is clearly always going to be the same as that for x 
vs. y.  There is obviously no dictator.  And lastly, the preferences of the 2 individuals 
clearly satisfy the diverse-1 preferences assumption. 
  6  In short, example 3 shows that if we drop the Pareto principle, the remaining 3 
assumptions can be mutually consistent. 
  We turn to our fourth simple example.  Here we start with the individual 
preferences of examples 1 and 3 above, and simply make person 1 a dictator: 
Example 4: 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(1 is Dictator)
a c  a 
b a  b 
c b  c 
 
The moral of  example 4 should be clear:  if we drop the no dictator assumption, the 
remaining 3 assumptions can be mutually consistent.  
  And now to our last simple example, where NI doesn’t hold.  We start with the 
individual preferences of examples 1,3 and 4, and we assume social preferences as 
shown: 
Example 5: 
Person 1 Person 2 Society
a c a 
b a c 
c b b 
 
In example 5, the assumptions of Pareto and no dictator are obviously met, and the 
assumption of diverse-1 preferences is also met.  However, the NI assumption doesn’t 
hold.  (Compare the social treatment of a vs. c, where the two people are split and person 
1 gets his way, to the social treatment of b vs. c, where the two people are split and 
  7person 2 gets his way.)  Example 5 shows that if we drop NI, the remaining assumptions 
can be mutually consistent. 
 
4.  Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1, n = 2. 
  We are ready to turn to a very simple and transparent version of Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem, in our single-profile model.  This version of the impossibility 
theorem relies on there being only 2 people in society.  Therefore, throughout this 
section, we assume n = 2.  We will show that our 4 assumptions, the strong Pareto 
principle, NI, no dictator, and diverse-1 preferences,  are mutually inconsistent. 
First we establish proposition 1, which is by itself a strong result.  Then we prove 
our first simple version of Arrow’s theorem
1. 
 
Proposition 1:   Assume n = 2.  Assume the strong Pareto principle, and NI.  
Suppose for some pair of alternatives x and y, xPiy and yPjx.  Suppose that xPy.  
Then person i is a dictator. 
Proof:  Let  w and z be any pair of alternatives.  Assume wPiz.  We need to show 
that wPz must hold.  If wRjz, then wPz by strong Pareto.  If not wRjz, then zPjw by 
completeness for j’s preference relation, and then wPz by NI.  QED.  
 
Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1:  Assume n = 2.  The assumptions of the strong 
Pareto principle, NI, no dictator, and diverse-1 preferences are mutually 
inconsistent. 
                                                 
1 In our theorem we are using strong Pareto, NI, no dictator, and diverse-1 preferences to get impossibility.  
With an almost identical proof we could use standard Pareto, NIM, no dictator, and diverse-1 preferences to 
get impossibility, where NIM is a strengthened version of NI, to be discussed below. 
  8Proof:  By diverse-1 preferences there exist x, y and z such that xPiy for i = 1, 2, 
but such that opinions are split on x vs. z, and on y vs. z. 
  Now xPy by the Pareto principle, standard or strong.   Since opinions are 
split on x vs. z, one person prefers x to z, while the other prefers z to x.  If xPz, 
then the person who prefers x to z is a dictator, by proposition 1.  If zPx, then the 
person who prefers z to x is a dictator, by proposition 1.   
 Suppose  xIz.  Then zIx.  By transitivity, zIx and xPy implies zPy.  But 
opinions are split on y vs. z.  One person, say i, is getting his way on z vs. y, in 
face of the opposition of the other person, say j.  By proposition 1, person i would 
then be a dictator.  As a dictator he would have to get his way on x vs. z also. 
(Remember, opinions are split on x vs. z, so he is not indifferent).  We conclude 
that  xIz is impossible.  QED. 
 
5.  Trying to Generalize to an n-Person Model. 
  In what follows we will seek to generalize our version of Arrow’s theorem to 
societies with arbitrary numbers of people.  From this point on in the paper we will 
assume that  .  In order to get an impossibility theorem when  , we will need to 
strengthen some of our basic assumptions.  We start with the neutrality/independence 
assumption.  We will strengthen it to a single-profile version of what is called 
neutrality/independence/monotonicity, or NIM.  (See Blau & Deb (1977), who call the 
multi-profile analog “full neutrality and monotonicity”; Sen (1977), who calls it NIM; 
and Pollak (1979), who calls it “nonnegative responsiveness.”)   
2 ≥ n 2 ≥ n
 
  9 (2.b)  Neutrality/independence/monotonicity (NIM).  Suppose the support for 
w over z is as strong or stronger than the support for x over y, and suppose the 
opposite support, for z over w, is as weak or weaker than  the support for y over x.   
Then, if the social preference is for x over y, the social preference must also be for 
w over z .  More formally:  For all x, y, z, and w, assume that for all i, xPiy implies 
wPiz, and that for all i, zPiw implies yPix.  Then xPy implies wPz.  
 
 Does this strengthening of the neutrality assumption, by itself, give us an Arrow 
impossibility theorem when  ?  The answer is No.  In example 6 there are 3 people 
and 4 alternatives, a, b, c and d.  The preferences of individuals 1, 2 and 3 are shown in 
the first 3 columns of the table.  The fourth column shows social preferences under 




Person 1 Person 2 Person 3
Society 
(Majority Rule)
a c a  a 
b a c  c 
c b d  b 
d d b  d 
 
  Let us comment on these preferences.  We start with exactly the people and 
preferences of example 1 above, although we throw in a fourth alternative d, at the 
bottoms of their lists.  Then we add the third person, with preferences somewhat like 
  10person 1’s (although he switches b and c).  Person 3 also puts d next to last on his list, 
rather than last.  
The three people use simple majority rule to define social preferences.  The 
resulting social preferences are as follows:  aPb, aPc, aPd, cPb, bPd, and cPd.  This 
(strict) social ordering is shown in the last column of the table.  Note that the social 
preference relation is logically fine. 
Let’s go back and check the 4 conditions that we thought might produce an 
impossibility result.  Given the use of simple majority rule, and given the particular 
preference profile we have assumed, do the conditions hold?  For Pareto (either standard 
or strong), the answer is obviously yes.  NIM is not instantly obvious, but, since majority 
rule simply counts instances of xPiy and yPix and compares the counts, it has to hold.  
How about dictatorship?  If there were a dictator, the social preference relation would 
have to be identical to one of the individual preference relations, which it isn’t.  Finally, 
what about diverse-1 preferences?  Take (a,b,c) as the (x,y,z) triple in the definition of 
diverse-1 preferences.  Note that aPib for all i, and that opinions are split  on a vs. c, as 
required by the assumption, and that opinions are similarly split on b vs. c.  So the 
diverse-1 preferences assumption holds. 
In short, example 6 shows that the assumptions of the Pareto principle, 
neutrality/independence/monotonicity, no dictator, and diverse-1 preferences are not 





  116.  Diversity. 
  In this section we will modify the diverse preferences assumption. 
  Before doing so, let’s revisit the assumption in the n = 2 world.   In that world, 
diverse-1 preferences says there must exist a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xPiy 
for i = 1,2, but such that opinions are split on x vs. z and on y vs. z.  That is, one person 
prefers x to z, while the other prefers z to x, and one person prefers y to z, while the other 
prefers z to y.  Given our assumption that individual preferences are transitive, it must be 
the case that the two people’s preferences over the triple can be represented as follows: 
Diverse-1 preferences array, n = 2.  





Note that this is exactly the preference profile pattern of examples 1, 3, 4 and 5.   The 
reader familiar with social choice theory may recognize the preferences in this table as 
being two thirds of the Condorcet voting paradox preferences, as shown below: 
Condorcet voting paradox array. 
Person i Person j  Person k
x z y 
y x z 
z y x 
   
A similar array of preferences is used by Arrow in the proof of his impossibility 
theorem (e.g. Arrow (1963), p. 58), and by many others since, including us (Feldman & 
Serrano (2006), p. 294).  For the moment, assume V is any non-empty set of people in 
  12society, that V
C is the complement of V, and that V is partitioned into two non-empty 
subsets V1 and V2.  (Note that V
C  may be empty.)  The standard preference profile used in 
many versions of Arrow’s theorem looks like this: 
Standard Arrow array. 
People in V1 People in V2 People  in  V
C
x z  y 
y x  z 
z y  x 
 
Now, let’s return to the question of how to modify the diverse preferences 
assumption.  Example 6 shows that we cannot stick with the diverse-1 preferences array.  
We might start with the Condorcet voting paradox array, but if  , we would have to 
worry about the preferences of people other than i,  j and k.  That suggests using 
something like the standard Arrow array.  However, assuming the existence of a triple x, 
y, and z, and preferences as per that array, for any subset of people V and any partition of 
V, is an unnecessarily strong diversity assumption. 
4 ≥ n
An even stronger diversity assumption was in fact used by Parks (1976), Pollak 
and other originators of single-profile Arrow theorems.  Pollak (1979) is clearest in his 
definition.  His condition of “unrestricted domain over triples” requires the following:  
Imagine “any logically possible sub-profile” of individual preferences over 3 
“hypothetical” alternatives x, y and z.  Then there exist 3 actual alternatives a, b and c for 
which the sub-profile of preferences exactly matches that “logically possible sub-profile” 
over x, y and z.   We will call this Pollak diversity.  Let us consider what this assumption 
requires in the simple world of strict preferences, 2 people, and 3 alternatives.  Pollak 
  13diversity would require that every one of the following arrays be represented, somewhere 
in the actual preference profile of the two people over the actual alternatives: 
Pollak diversity arrays, n = 2.  
1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2  
x x  x  x  x  y  x  y  x z  x z 
y y  y  z  y  x  y z  y  x  y  y 
z  z    z y   z z    z x   z y   z x 
   
The first pair of columns says 1 and 2 agree on what’s best, what’s in the middle, 
and  what’s worst.  The second pair says they agree on what’s best only.  The third pair 
says they agree on what’s worst only.  The fourth and fifth pairs are diverse-1 
preferences; the existence of either pattern would satisfy our diverse-1 assumption, but 
Pollak diversity would require both, since Pollak diversity does not allow free permuting 
of individuals 1 and 2 .  The sixth pair says they agree only on what’s in the middle. 
Note that the number of arrays in the table above is 3! = 6.  If n were equal to 3 
we would have triples of columns instead of pairs, and there would have to be (3!)
2 = 36 
such triples.  With n people, the number of required n-tuples would be (3!)
n-1.    In short, 
the number of arrays required for Pollak diversity rises exponentially with n.  The 
number of alternatives rises with the number of required arrays, although not as fast 
because of array overlaps.  Parks (1976) uses an assumption (“diversity in society”) that 
is very similar to Pollak’s, although not so clear, and he indicates that it “requires at least 
3
n alternatives...”  
We believe Pollak diversity is much stronger than necessary, and we will proceed 
as follows.  We will not assume the existence of a triple x, y and z to give every 
conceivable array of preferences on that triple.  We will not even assume a triple x, y and 
  14z to give every possible array for given V, V1, V2, and V
C, as per the description of the 
standard Arrow array.  We will only assume the existence of the required Arrow-type 
triple, and we will only assume that much when the Arrow array matters.  For the 
purposes of our proof, the Arrow array assumption only matters when V is a decisive set.  
We say that a set of people V is decisive if it is non-empty and if, for any 
alternatives x and y, if xPiy for all i in V, then xPy. 
It is appropriate to make a few comments about the notion of decisiveness.  First, 
note that if person i is a dictator, then i by himself is a decisive set, and any set containing 
i is also decisive.  Also, note that the Pareto principle (standard or strong) implies the set 
of all people is decisive.  Second, in a multi-preference profile world, decisiveness for V 
would be a stronger assumption that it is in the single-profile world, since it would 
require that (the same) V prevail no matter how preferences might change.  We only 
require that V prevail under the given fixed preference profile. 
Our diversity assumption is now modified as follows: 
 
(4.b)  Diverse-2 preferences.  For any decisive set V with 2 or more members, 
there exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xPiy for all i in V; such that 
yPiz and zPix for everyone outside of V; and such that V can be partitioned into 
non-empty subsets V1 and V2, where the members of V1 all put z last in their 
rankings over the triple, and the members of V2 all put z first in their rankings 
over the triple. 
 
  15The assumption of diverse-2 preferences means that for any decisive set V with 2 
or more members, there is a triple x, y, and z, and a partition of V, which produces exactly 
the standard Arrow array shown above.  One disadvantage of this particular definition is 
that one must know what sets of individuals are decisive, before one can say whether 
preferences are diverse, and to know what sets of individuals are decisive one has to 
know the social preference relation.  Nonetheless, it is a logical definition. 
  Referring back to example 6 of the previous section, consider persons 2 and 3.  
Under simple majority rule, which was assumed in the example, they constitute a 
decisive coalition.  The reader is invited to show that the diverse-2 preferences 
assumption  fails in this example, because there is no way to define the triple x, y, z so as 
to get the standard Arrow array, when  V1  = {2}, V2 = {3}, and V
C  = {1}.  Therefore the 
assumption of diverse-2 preferences rules out example 6. 
  We now make 3 simple observations about the assumptions of diverse-1 
preferences, diverse-2 preferences, and Pollak diversity.  (For the sake of brevity we omit 
the obvious proofs.) 
 
Observation 1:   Assume n = 2.   Then diverse-1 preferences implies diverse-2 
preferences. 
 Observation 2:   Assume n = 2.   Assume the (standard) Pareto principle.  Then 
diverse-2 preferences implies diverse-1 preferences. 
Observation 3:  Assume  .  Pollak diversity implies diverse-1 preferences 
and diverse-2 preferences. 
2 ≥ n
 
  167.  Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2,  .  2 ≥ n
We now proceed to a proof of our second single-profile Arrow’s theorem, which, 
unlike our first proof, is not restricted to a 2-person society.
2  Although Pollak made a 
much stronger diversity assumption than we use, and although Parks (1976), Hammond 
(1976), and Kemp and Ng (1976), preceded Pollak with single-profile Arrow theorems, 
we will call this the Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem, because of the similarity of our 
proof to his.  But first, we need a proposition paralleling proposition 1:  
  
Proposition 2:  Assume  , and NIM.  Assume there is a non-empty group of 
people V and a pair of alternatives x and y, such that xP
2 ≥ n
iy for all i in V and yPix for 
all i not in V.  Suppose that xPy.  Then V is decisive. 
Proof:  Let  w and z be any pair of alternatives.  Assume wPiz for all i in V.  We 
need to show that wPz must hold.  This follows immediately from NIM.  QED.  
 
Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2:  Assume  .  The assumptions of 
the Pareto principle, NIM, no dictator, and diverse-2 preferences are mutually 
inconsistent. 
2 ≥ n
Proof:  By the Pareto principle, the set of all individuals is decisive.  Therefore 
decisive sets exist.  Let V be a decisive set of minimal size, that is, a decisive set 
with no proper subsets that are also decisive.  We will show that there is only one 
person in V, which will make that person a dictator.  This will establish Arrow’s 
theorem. 
  Suppose to the contrary that V has 2 or more members.  By the diverse-2 
                                                 
2 We have a similar proof for a multi-profile Arrow’s theorem in Feldman & Serrano (2006). 
  17preferences assumption there is a triple of alternatives x, y, and z, and a partition 
of V into non-empty subsets V1 and V2, giving the standard Arrow array as shown 
above.  Since V is decisive, it must be true that xPy.  Next we consider the social 
preference for x vs. z. 
  Case 1.  Suppose zRx.  Then zPy by transitivity.  Then V2 becomes 
decisive by proposition 2 above.  But this is a contradiction, since we assumed 
that V was a decisive set of minimal size. 
  Case 2.  Suppose not zRx.  Then the social preference must be xPz, by 
completeness.  But in this case V1 is getting its way in the face of opposition by 
everyone else, and by proposition 2 above V1 is decisive, another contradiction.  
QED. 
 
8.  Last Examples. 
The reader is invited to revisit examples 2, 3, 4, and 5, using the diverse-2 
preferences assumption instead of the diverse-1 assumption.  If she does, she will find 
that the comments surrounding all 4 examples stay the same.  That is, in each example, 
one Arrow assumption is relaxed, and the remaining 3 can co-exist.  Example 2 fails both 
diverse-1 preferences and diverse-2 preferences.  Example 3 satisfies diverse-1 
preferences, and also satisfies diverse-2 preferences vacuously, because there are no 
decisive sets. Examples 4 and 5 satisfy both diverse-1 preferences and diverse-2 
preferences.  In fact, observations 1 and 2 together imply that when n = 2 and the Pareto 
principle holds, the diverse-1 and diverse-2 assumptions are equivalent, and we have the 
  18Pareto principle in examples 2, 4 and 5.   In example 3 we don’t have the Pareto 
principle, but both diversity assumptions are nonetheless satisfied. 
Example 7 below shows that the assumption of diverse-2 preferences is not an 
impossibly strong assumption, when the Pareto principle is assumed, and when there are 
3 or more people.  In this example, we assume person 1 is a dictator; so the social 
preferences are exactly his preferences.  The decisive sets are {1}, {1,2}, {1,3}, and 
{1,2,3}.  The diverse-2 preferences assumption allows us to ignore the decisive set {1}, 
because it  doesn’t have 2 or more members. In the right hand column of the table below  
we indicate which decisive set is playing the role of the V of the assumption, for the 
corresponding triple of alternatives, which is playing the role of x, y, and z. 
Example 7: 
Person 1 Person  2 Person  3 
Society 
(1 is Dictator)  V 
a b c  a {1,2} 
b c a  b {1,2} 
c a b  c {1,2} 
d f e  d  {1,3} 
e d f  e {1,3} 
f e d  f {1,3} 
g h h  g  {1,2,3} 
h i i  h  {1,2,3} 
i g g  i  {1,2,3} 
 
 For  V = {1,2}, we let (x,y,z) = (a,b,c), and we see that the array condition for 
diverse-2 preferences holds.  Similarly, for V = {1,3}, we let (x,y,z) = (d,e,f); and for V = 
{1,2,3}, we let (x,y,z) = (g,h,i).  Therefore this preference profile satisfies diverse-2 
preferences.  
  19 
9.  Conclusions. 
  We have presented two single-profile Arrow impossibility theorems which are 
simple and transparent.  The first theorem, which requires  2 = n , relies on a very simple 
and modest assumption about diversity of preferences within the given preference profile, 
and on a relatively modest neutrality/independence assumption.  The second theorem, 
which allows  , uses a substantially more complicated assumption about diversity of 
preferences within the given profile, and uses a stronger 
neutrality/independence/monotonicity assumption.  Both theorems support the claim that 
Arrow impossibility happens even if individual preferences about alternatives are given 
and fixed. 
2 ≥ n
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